Time Is Up: Fast Decisions for the Air Force We Need

The United States Air Force is older, smaller, and less modern than optimal. But it is still the single most powerful military force the world has ever known. If carefully managed, the current force can provide immediate deterrent power and a springboard to the future. The Air Force has most of what it needs to deter China, even if some of it is still conceptual. What the Air Force needs most is faster production.

With China’s rise to nuclear peer status, US national security decision-makers must make the most of the existing force and programs to sustain conventional and strategic deterrence. Leaders must resist the temptation to abandon ship and terminate major programs. Fortunately, the Air Force is well aware of the challenge of ramping up to deal with threats from China, Russia, and others across domains. “The world is more dangerous now than it’s been in my entire career,” General Thomas Bussiere, commander of the Global Strike Command, said on December 5, 2024.¹

The Air Force has to catch up while preparing for a multi-theater, multi-domain fight and implementing a transition to unmanned systems. As Senator Deb Fischer said, “We have to set priorities of government, and the first priority is the national defense of this country. That’s where our resources should be going.”²

Time is up. This is the Air Force, whose airmen will guard significant US national interests against a world of escalating military threats and influence. The Trump administration can make decisions about the Air Force that will strengthen air dominance and conventional and strategic deterrence. This chapter outlines several of those decisions—on the B-21 Raider bomber, the F-35, collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), intelligent data gateways for tankers and airlifters, air base defense, and more. It is by no means a comprehensive plan; the aim is rather to emphasize some of the most urgent decisions that are ripe for leadership.

America’s Air Force

The Air Force’s capabilities are sized around nuclear deterrence and providing a broad suite of dominant, conventional military power to combatant commanders for use in scenarios ranging from major theater war to special operations. More than any other service, the Air Force is tasked with delivering specific, mission-essential support to other branches, ranging from air mobility to aerial refueling to close air support and indirect fires. This is because airpower in all its forms has long been the global framework for America’s conventional and strategic deterrence.

The United States Air Force became an independent branch in 1947 due to its combat performance in World War II. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme allied commander, Europe, recognized that in order to land forces in Normandy on D-Day, the Allies would have to depend on an “overpowering air force” that would make German counter-concentration fail.³ Thus America entered the war with a production plan and an airpower strategy that executed the great bombing campaigns to take control of the air from the Luftwaffe. In the Pacific, island bases from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima were taken at great cost to extend the operational reach of airpower in shaping the theater. Then, as now, air superiority was the overriding goal. The US Army Air Forces, commanded by General H. H. “Hap” Arnold, operated independently to the degree that creation of a separate Air Force was widely applauded after the war.

By the early 1950s, the new Air Force had adopted jet engines, nuclear weapons, and aerial refueling; maintained occupied Berlin with an airlift; established nuclear deterrence; and provided air superiority and supporting fires in Korea. However, it was this demonstrated ability to shape war at the operational and global level—and to deliver a decisive combat punch—that made airpower the basis for the military component of America’s superpower status.

The Air Force proved adept at developing and incorporating new technologies, from ICBMs to satellites and cyberspace. In its first decades, the Air Force also excelled at growing leaders for complex and innovative technology programs. For example, a P-51 Mustang pilot named Sam Phillips later worked on ICBM programs, became a lieutenant general, and was loaned to NASA to run the Apollo program culminating in the Apollo 11 landing on the Moon. Confident decision-making allowed the Air Force to push new capabilities forward rapidly.

From an operational perspective, US strategy continued to rely on air superiority and the delivery of firepower in conjunction with ground forces. This combination was at the core of the US strategy to deter the Soviet Union and was used with great effect against the forces of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria again saw airpower set the terms of the fight. The war to defeat the ISIS caliphate consumed 90,991 strike sorties alone; another 56,198 sorties in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and many more for air refueling and mobility. The “well-tuned integration of U.S. and coalition airpower [was] the lead player in [Operation Inherent Resolve’s] effort against ISIS.”⁴

The Air Force is a global force, and there is no going back on this commitment. At the moment, Air Force fighters of all types have been deployed to the Middle East to deter Iran, bolster Israel’s air defenses, and boost protection for US forces deployed to the region. Unlike the Cold War, today’s top adversaries, China and Russia, are export powerhouses, one in goods and technology and the other in oil and mayhem.⁵ With the global information economy, protection of NATO members like the Netherlands and partners like Taiwan is a prerequisite for keeping America’s place in the artificial intelligence revolution unfolding at breakneck speed.

The New Decision Matrix: Airpower and Conventional Deterrence

At this tense geopolitical juncture, the United States Air Force is launching the most significant transition to its basic force structure since the development of jet engines and nuclear weapons. This is the transition toward unmanned systems with artificial intelligence integrated tightly with forces for executing major combat operations. Success will ensure the dominance of American military power in the crucial decades to come.

Several variables are in play. The most crucial is the F-35 program, which provides both the mass for lethality and the springboard to more unmanned teaming. Other factors shaping the fighter force for conventional deterrence include the retirement of older fighters while balancing the force for different threat environments, preparing for mission partnering with CCAs, and ensuring next-generation air dominance.

The F-35

The transition toward unmanned systems is taking place while conventional airpower remains in high demand for military operations. The first phase of the transition toward unmanned systems centers on enhancing today’s fighter and bomber force. The new core of this force is the F-35. By now, the Air Force was expected to have restocked with F-35s and retired most of its A-10s and F-15s and many of its F-16s, but this has not happened. By law, the Air Force must maintain 1,800 fighters in the inventory, with 1,145 in combat-ready status. The Air Force has a total force of 2,093 fighters, with just 1,452 in the active component, 536 in the Air National Guard, and 105 in the Air Force Reserve for a total of 2,093 fighters, averaging 26 years of age. The newest F-35s tally 408 aircraft as of 2024.⁶

The history of this joint program, managed by an outside Joint Program Office, has long attracted criticism. The F-35 is the only major weapons system run in this manner. The creation of a joint program during the Clinton administration’s early years has contributed to the program’s escalating costs and schedule delays. For example, the Joint Program Office has frequently revised cost and schedule goals, and in 2024, the Government Accountability Office found that the Joint Program Office had failed to award contracts related to engine improvements and thermal management subsystems.⁷

The Trump administration should consider disbanding the F-35 Joint Program Office to return authority to the Air Force and Navy. The Air Force should take over management of the F-35A variant, including those flown by most allies and international partners, while the US Navy should assume responsibility for the F-35B vertical takeoff and landing and F-35C carrier landing variants flown by the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the United Kingdom’s armed forces.

Despite the Joint Strike Fighter program’s mediocre acquisition history, the F-35 is a highly capable and combat-tested jet that has become the centerpiece of tactical airpower. As older aircraft retire, the F-35, along with some F-15EXs, will deliver the mass of combat striking power in conflict with China or other adversaries. The F-35 capabilities surpass those of the older F-15 and F-16 because the F-35 was designed from the outset to combine radar-evading stealth and reduced infrared signature management, with significant offensive and defensive electronic warfare capabilities integrating target detection, threat warning, countermeasures, and a 360-degree view. Sophisticated datalinks enable the F-35 to grab targeting tracks compiled by off-board platforms. The F-35 stealth fighter carries weapons internally and includes advanced mission systems that maximize offensive strike capabilities. Its powerful radar is also optimized to detect and engage cruise missiles, as an Israeli F-35 demonstrated in late 2023. These capabilities also make the F-35 the primary manned platform for working with drones and CCA.

The F-35 is also battle-tested. As the war against ISIS wound down, the F-35 flew in and around the Russian integrated air defenses in Syria, performing well in the contested environment. The Air Force deployed F-35s for a consecutive 18-month period, with 42 F-35s flying more than 1,300 sorties averaging five hours in duration. The F-35s dropped 350 weapons, expended 3,700 cannon gun rounds, and maintained a mission-capable rate of 70 percent.⁸ In its most recent combat applications with Israel, F-35s destroyed most of Iran’s air defenses in October, and they have intercepted Houthi-launched cruise missiles.⁹ With this track record, the F-35 remains the right fighter for carrying out missions and growing unmanned, collaborative capabilities.

However, the F-35 needs the highest level of attention to increase production rates and streamline upgrades and investment. For example, the Air Force requested 42 F-35s to be purchased in fiscal year 2025, but Congress authorized 30. This rate is too slow to replace the more than 500 Air Force F-16Cs and F-16Ds in the active component with an average age of over 32 years. The Air Force must also take a wartime attitude and make decisions on priority requirements for the Block 4 upgrade, including cutting some requirements and selecting benchmarks for others. The Block 4 upgrade program started with over 80 requirements, some dating back years. The upgrades are not mere options; they include systems essential to networked air warfare and exploiting information dominance and autonomy. In some cases, as with thermal management, solutions cannot progress until the Block 4 requirements are set.

The Air Force has also committed to improvements to its F135 engine and a separate, upgraded power and cooling system to handle the spiking thermal management of new avionics and mission systems. (The F-35 was designed for about 14 kilowatts of heat dissipation but must now achieve 80 kilowatts or better.) The Air Force has funded programs for both but must execute them.

The F-35 list of international partners grew to 20 nations when Romania committed to fly F-35s in November 2024. The F-35 has become a bastion of airpower and security for NATO. For example, on December 1, 2024, four Norwegian F-35s rotated to Rzeszow Airport in Poland, near Ukraine, as part of the NATO mission for air sovereignty.¹⁰

Finally, the F-35 is also the mainstay for extended nuclear deterrence: the deployment of nuclear-armed tactical aircraft to reinforce allies. Certain other US Air Force fighters are nuclear certified, but the F-35 is the only advanced stealth fighter that carries nuclear weapons. The F-35 completed nuclear certification in October 2023 after 10 years of testing—and ahead of a pledge to NATO allies that certification would be in place by January 2024.¹¹ The F-35 carries the B61-12 gravity bomb. The B61-12 has an 825-pound, 12-foot-long bomb body with an accuracy of 30 meters and fusing options for a variable yield of 0.3, 1.5, 10, or 50 kilotons.¹² The dual-capable F-35 thus occupies a unique role in conventional and strategic deterrence—and it cannot be replaced by unmanned platforms.

For these reasons, the F-35 is nonnegotiable; it will form the bedrock of the US Air Force and allies for the next three decades. First, sinking mission-capable rates signal that the Air Force must be permitted to retire older fighters immediately, beginning with the A-10, F-15C, and F-15D. Next, the Air Force should revise its target of 1,763 F-35s and build a program with a higher ramp rate to acquire a force totaling at least 1,200 F-35s much faster, completing procurement within 10 years.

Mission Partnering with CCA

Retiring older aircraft will also speed the introduction of unmanned aircraft. The Air Force has started down the road toward unmanned “loyal wingmen” that work with crewed fighter planes and enhance their effectiveness. The Air Force made its first selection of designs for the CCA, but CCAs will not enter the force in numbers until after 2030. These early awards to General Atomics and Anduril represented designs only; CCAs may be manufactured by other companies after a downselect in 2026, and a second tranche of designs will be selected.

The Air Force is keeping its options open with a plan to buy approximately 100 CCAs by 2029 and a total of 1,000–2,000 by 2040. The budget request is for about $9 billion. The intent is to provide “a fairly transformative change to going away from the individual fighter pilots all out there at risk together, to giving our fighter pilots a wingman,” according to Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall.¹³ The CCAs build on an established trend of off-loading some mission capabilities to pods and drones. For example, the ALE-55-towed fiber-optic decoy, sometimes called the “flying zucchini,” is linked by a cable to a manned plane and functions as an electronic countermeasure against continuous-wave or pulsed threats. It is not much of a stretch to picture a CCA carrying out similar missions, sans cable, and expanding to sensing, jamming, communications and data linkage, and additional weapons employment. Spectrum dominance—fending off adversaries and exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum—describes the overarching mission. Some CCAs may carry small amounts of fuel for aerial refueling at the battle’s edge.

However, the primary missions of the CCAs will start by teaming with manned fighters and bombers (and perhaps other aircraft). To this end, the Viper Experimentation and Next-Gen Operations Model and other experiments had F-16s with autonomy routines stand in for the CCAs paired with manned fighters to explore attributes and tactics.¹⁴

CCAs should be pursued and funded as vital complements to the F-35, B-21, and other systems but not yet as replacements for all missions carried out by manned aircraft.

Next Generation Air Dominance. Since 2014, the Air Force has been at work on a next-generation platform to replace the F-22 and take on other air superiority and attack roles. The overall program includes the CCA and other elements in the “family of systems.” The crewed component of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) has been an Air Force priority for well over a decade. Surfacing occasionally under different names, such as Penetrating Combat Aircraft, the mission has remained about the same—to penetrate at longer range using all possible stealth, speed, and altitude to hold the most difficult targets at risk. Demonstrator aircraft have flown, and a decision was expected in 2024. However, Secretary of the Air Force Kendall delayed the decision in order to reevaluate mission capabilities and cost.

The Trump administration should continue with a contract award for NGAD to begin engineering and manufacturing development. Without NGAD, the operational risks multiply, as no other platform is designed specifically for penetrating attacks against enemy air defenses and aircraft. For example, the Air Force has not made the case that CCAs without an NGAD can take on all the repeat penetration attacks required for some target sets. Targets in the enemy interior may require repeated restrike—be that space launch sites on Hainan Island, China’s five ground-based laser weapon bases, or some menace lurking in the mountains of North Korea or Iran.¹⁵ However, until the NGAD is fielded, the Air Force must continue to upgrade the combat-coded F-22s and accelerate any systems upgrades and enhancements.

Rated Aircrew. Stronger conventional deterrence requires proficient pilots, and the Air Force should invest in operations and maintenance funding to beef up flying hours for combat pilots. Even with unmanned combat aircraft in development, the Air Force is still reliant on its pilot force. However, the Air Force is short of pilots and has cut back training hours. The Air Force said it was short 1,142 fighter pilots in 2024.¹⁶ For the fighter force, monthly active duty flying hours improved from 5.7 hours in 2019 to 10.7 hours in 2022.¹⁷ That figure is still far below previous proficiency levels. In the 1980s and 1990s, pilots flew over 16 hours per month, a mark that set them apart from adversaries and allies. Per month, 12 hours sustain capability, while 16 hours—about four sorties per week—allows pilots to “get better at everything.”¹⁸

Rated aircrew are also the source for complex mission planning and the integration of spectrum warfare. With the systems and techniques for accomplishing air superiority changing so fast, the Air Force needs pilots skilled in the complexities of air operations for its own combat operations and as senior leaders making procurement and force-sizing decisions. Plus, it will take at least another generation of highly trained, skilled pilots to shepherd the transition to greater reliance on unmanned collaborative aircraft. The Air Force should increase its flying hour program. In addition, the Air Force must resolve delays affecting the T-7 undergraduate training aircraft, now in development but scheduled to deliver ultimately about 350 aircraft.

Two Legs of the Triad for Nuclear Deterrence

The Air Force is in the early phases of a major modernization of its two legs of the nuclear triad: the bomber force and the ICBMs. The B-21 Raider stealth bomber will replace the 19 remaining B-2 Spirits in the bomber leg of the triad, while a completely new Sentinel missile will replace the Minuteman III. Modernization of the nuclear triad also includes the Navy’s Columbia-class submarines. The Columbia class will carry 16 missiles, with the first ship scheduled for operations in 2031.¹⁹ A former Air Force vice chief of staff said,

Each leg brings unique complementary attributes which are mutually supporting and key to signaling and establishing deterrence amidst an increasingly complex and dynamic security environment which, for the first time, includes the People’s Republic of China as a major nuclear armed power and strategic competitor.²⁰

The 2017–21 Trump administration was fully supportive of triad modernization. Since then, risk has grown due to China’s nuclear acceleration and hiccups with Columbia-class submarines and the Sentinel missiles. The key components are schedule and adroit management.

Hedging against risk is part of nuclear strategy,²¹ and one of the most efficient hedge measures is to procure more B-21s. The Columbia-class submarines have experienced delays that will constrain the program. In contrast, flight-testing of the B-21 is proceeding swiftly. The Trump administration should double production of the B-21 bomber, aiming to produce a total fleet of between 200 and 400 B-21s. To do this, the program should open a second manufacturing site for resilience and to speed up production.

The B-21 made its first flight on November 10, 2023, and three aircraft are now in testing, with flights occurring several times per month. Officially, the Air Force buy is 80–100 aircraft, but the consensus from the strategic posture review is that at least 200 are needed. Former National Security Adviser Robert C. O’Brien has advocated for between 300 and 400 B-21s.²² The B-21 could also be a prime focus for CCAs. The design of the B-21 has intentionally preserved a path for integrating CCAs into the bomber’s air dominance mission set. Given the additional crew and space on the B-21, the new bomber could handle a wide range of assignments alongside CCAs.

The B-21 has benefited from industry lessons learned from the F-117, B-2, F-22, and F-35 programs and from having the program run by the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). The program is coming in below the inflation-adjusted unit cost target of about $700 million per aircraft. The F-117 stealth fighter program of the early 1980s had a compressed acquisition cycle configured for steady-rate production, and the B-21 should follow suit and set a new production target and revise the production rate. Former RCO Director Randall Walden has stated that production could be increased quickly with funding for additional tooling.²³ The Air Force should also authorize a second site for production, perhaps at or near Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center or a similar location. Given increasing threats to the US homeland, a second site might be prudent.

Also vital for the triad’s bomber leg is the Long Range Stand Off weapon (LRSO), the successor to the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile, to be deployed on the B-52J. The AGM-181 LRSO is vital to the triad because it can be launched from longer ranges, and its stealthy characteristics will make it the most survivable and flexible of the bomber munitions.

Next is the mammoth project known as Sentinel, which will replace the triad’s land-based leg. The Air Force’s Minuteman III was first deployed in 1970. At nearly 80,000 pounds, this missile can be launched in minutes from its unmanned silo. At 50 years old, Minuteman is already operating years beyond its planned service life and can no longer be effectively upgraded.

The case for the triad’s ICBM leg rests on its deterrent role. ICBMs are the fastest nuclear-strike weapon, able to reach targets in about an hour. The concept is that a force of 400 ICBMs thus forces an adversary to assign at least 400 weapons to target the ICBM force, all while facing assured second-strike retaliation from submarines and the bomber force. This raises costs and deters a nuclear strike. The case has been made for a road-mobile version of the Sentinel to complicate adversary targeting and enhance survivability.²⁴ While the idea may have merit, the rise of space surveillance, drones, and other forms of tracking could affect those advantages.

Sentinel is an entirely new design intended to last through 2075. The program will build 400 missiles and refurbish 450 silos along with updating more than 600 facilities located in eight states. Missiles are on alert 24-7, and the swap out will occur without changing the alert status. United States Strategic Command has set a deadline of September 2030 for the initial operational capability for Sentinel. Sentinel missile technical data will be purchased by the Air Force to allow multiple contractors to compete on maintenance projects over the Sentinel’s 50-year lifespan.²⁵ Milestone B, the go-ahead for engineering and manufacturing development, was passed in 2020; however, that milestone was rescinded in 2024 pending further review of requirements and restructuring of the program. The development of the missile is on pace, but costs and requirements associated with the launch facilities and other components of the vast infrastructure have grown, exacerbated by inflation.

The Sentinel program needs a champion. The Trump administration should appoint a single “nuclear czar” empowered to make decisions to streamline requirements and produce a new schedule. Modernizing the triad’s land-based leg is something that has not been done for 60 years. Early Air Force ICBMs had a single architect, General Bernard Schriever, who began the programs in 1954 and oversaw Thor, Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman (and cultivated leaders such as his aforementioned protégé, Phillips). Then as now, leadership required close contact with industry and ruthless decisions on requirements. Schriever was fortunate to have President Eisenhower’s personal attention in the missile programs’ formative years.

Finally, credible nuclear deterrence starts with command and control. The rise of a two-peer threat has sped up the Air Force’s requirement to modernize nuclear command and control.²⁶ The Air Force’s E-4B Nightwatch aircraft (which are militarized 747-200s) were all delivered before 1985. A key program is the new Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), a group of wide-body jets that will be modified with communications for airborne command of nuclear forces and hardened to withstand a nuclear attack environment. SAOC is the top priority for nuclear C3 modernization, and the Trump administration should fully support it.

Intelligent Mobility Under Fire

The US Air Force’s global reach depends on air refueling tankers and mobility aircraft. Protecting these high-value assets is crucial to air dominance. Unlike in past decades, the Air Force is now training its mobility forces to face contested airspace, bases under attack, and cyber blackouts that impair logistics. To cope with these threats, the Trump administration should urgently fund digital and AI upgrades to the mobility and tanker fleet that will incorporate them more fully into the networked battle space and allow them to function as data links and communications nodes. This is essential for their own defense and agility and to maintain the flow of fuel, parts, people, and aeromedical evacuation.

During an air campaign, tankers are set up to fly tracks in 30-by-70 nautical mile boxes where thirsty fighters can find them fast.²⁷ Tankers can put additional distributed command and control and beyond-line-of-sight data flows “near the fight and fighter aircraft who need the fuel,” said Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Andersen of the 513th Operations Support Squadron, who led the team in testing the Platform Agnostic Command and Control concept. Fighter intercepts like those of the Russian “Bear” bombers flying with a pair of Chinese H-6N nuclear-capable bombers in the high north depend on tanker support and typically take place beyond the line of sight, for example.²⁸

These upgrades are ready to go and should be procured as if on a wartime basis. Intelligent gateways with advanced, AI-enabled communications have been tested aboard mobility aircraft at exercises such as Northern Edge.²⁹ Tanker and mobility crews and command centers must also be given opportunities to train to proficiency in a high-data environment; simulated and live virtual constructive training, contracted out if necessary, can make a big difference in execution during a crisis.

KC-46 production should continue, as it provides the most direct path to recapitalizing the fleet. The increased fuel off-load and carrying capacity for cargo pallets, passengers, and medical evacuations are also valuable. Manned tankers will continue to dominate the future Air Force fleet and will be necessary for supporting the B-2, B-21, and B-52J in their nuclear deterrence missions due to the missions’ urgency. Deterring multiple nuclear competitors will stretch the global reactions of the bombers, which must be supported by tankers, including tankers able to stay on station near hostile areas as bombers penetrate. However, the Air Force is also evaluating potential unmanned tanker options as it pursues the Next Generation Air Refueling System, a design for a survivable, low-observable tanker. Research into this design should continue to be a high priority for the Air Force.

Fighting Under Attack: Defending Bases and Airspace

Air base defense has likewise become a key part of air superiority. Air bases operated under threats in the past, as examples from Balad in Iraq to Bien Hoa in Vietnam demonstrate. But the problem has grown much more severe with the rise of drones and cruise missiles and the soaring threat posed by Russia in Europe and China’s ballistic missiles in the Pacific.

The Trump administration should order an immediate “red team” review of base defense covering forward operating bases and bases on US territory. The administration should also encourage Congress to amend statutes to allow the Air Force to acquire and operate its own medium- and long-range systems. Since 1947, the Army has held statutory responsibility for air base defense. This is highly unusual. For example, the US Army operates the Patriot air defense system. Guam, with its two major runways, is receiving major upgrades to its layered defenses. Andersen Air Force Base is defended by a 48-missile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on the island but controlled by the Army from Hawaii, with assistance from Navy Aegis destroyers.³⁰ Nearly every other military in the world, including NATO partners, assigns air defense to its air force for reasons of efficiency. The Air Force has much to contribute and much to lose. For example, the F-35 may be able to take on incoming ballistic and cruise missiles.³¹

Special Operations

The Air Force operates nearly a dozen types of aircraft for special operations, ranging from gunships to the tilt-rotor CV-22 Osprey. The AC-130J Ghostrider featured prominently in US Central Command operations during the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. While it most often flies behind the scenes, this branch of airpower is essential to conventional deterrence.

The evolving gray-area strategy of opposing China with small-force packages at multiple points in the Pacific will rely heavily on Air Force special operations. Fortunately, the Air Force did recapitalize with the 55 MC-130J Commando IIs and 30 AC-130J Ghostriders, all of which are less than seven years old. In future years, the Trump administration should consider acquiring the Army Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and advanced tilt-rotor aircraft, with open systems architecture developed from the successful V-280 Valor demonstrator aircraft.

Conclusion

The United States Air Force came into being due to advances in technology that changed the way wars were fought. The airplane’s development and combat employment took the United States military from the days of balloons and mounted cavalry into the reaches of space. The Air Force has long embraced innovation and is actively seeking to retain its edge in a time of new technologies, from drones and spectrum dominance to artificial intelligence.

What the Air Force needs is rapid decisions and actions on its key priorities. Eisenhower’s expectations for airpower were formed when “the planes we needed did not yet exist,” but his group of planners took the role of airpower “almost as faith,” and American industry built the force to execute it.³² As this chapter has highlighted, new Air Force leadership has an opportunity to make bold and nimble decisions that strengthen deterrence and turn innovation into combat capability.

In the words of former Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper, “For those who have gone before us, who have given their lives so that we could have the greatest Air Force on Earth, so that we could enjoy the wonders of freedom and liberty, we pledge our best.”³³

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